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Abstract 
 
 
The rapid growth in digital data forms the basis for a wide range of new services and research, 
e.g, large-scale medical studies. At the same time, increasingly restrictive privacy concerns and 
laws are leading to significant overhead in arranging for sharing or combining different data sets 
to obtain these benefits. For new applications, where the benefit of combined data is not yet 
clear, this overhead can inhibit organizations from even trying to determine whether they can 
mutually benefit from sharing their data. In this paper, we discuss techniques to overcome this 
difficulty by employing private information transfer to determine whether there is a benefit from 
sharing data, and whether there is room to negotiate acceptable prices. These techniques 
involve cryptographic protocols. While currently considered secure, these protocols are 
potentially vulnerable to the development of quantum technology, particularly for ensuring 
privacy over significant periods of time into the future. To mitigate this concern, we describe how 
developments in practical quantum technology can improve the security of these protocols.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The Challenge of Protected Data 
Digital data collected, stored and processed by many organizations throughout the world are 
often key assets for their businesses. This leads them to protect their data as a major 
competitive advantage. In addition, countries or regional groups of countries such as the EU are 
increasingly mandating restrictions on how data can be shared by these organizations, 
particularly with those in other jurisdictions. These restrictions arise from broad concerns that 
misuse of this data poses both to individuals and to nations or societies at large. 
However, there is also a clear value in having much of that data widely shared for purposes that 
benefit all, such as medical research, the discovery of demographic trends and technological 
innovation, to name a few (Lazer et al. 2020). 
And yet, present trends in both national legislation and corporate attitudes are tilting the balance 
to more stringent privacy rules, which not only affect institutions interested in accessing 
pluralistic databases, but also address the natural desire of corporate needs to keep data 
private from competitors.  
A different and equally significant challenge is posed by online interactions and the massive 
amounts of information collected by institutions and some individuals. The challenge is 
manifested when a group of institutions or countries wish to work together to benefit from 
synergies among their different data sets. Each country has large amounts of data about its 
people, their demographics, medical history, prescribed treatment and outcomes, entertainment 
preferences, educational backgrounds, and technical data. This data contains a wealth of 
information that if shared or purchased by some members of the group could mutually benefit all 
parties. The question then arises as to how to exchange this data in such a way so as satisfy 
the privacy constraints imposed by different countries and institutions. 
For example, in the case of medical data, shared information could enable faster diagnosis and 
more effective treatment for similar cases. Equally important, ​there is an opportunity for massive 
sca​le "virtual clinical trials" by combining data from different groups, with the caveat that 
protocols are similar enough to allow merging outcome data. This is a case where groups may 
need detailed information to get full benefits of the data rather than just broad statistical 
summaries. However, this data usually contains extremely sensitive and private information both 
about patients and the hospitals. Thus, for a variety of reasons - including regulatory ones - 
sharing this data can be problematic. 
A different constraint on sharing in medical contexts arises due to anti-trust legislation. To 
prevent market collusion, the law prohibits competitors from sharing non-public information 
about their costs, price structure and production methods. In addition, sharing practices treated 
as trade secrets, rather than protected by patents, could harm the sharing company by giving up 
competitive advantages. However, sharing production knowledge can have a public benefit of 
rapidly increasing capacity of an industry as companies learn best practices from each other. 
This is particularly relevant when trying to rapidly expand manufacturing capacity, such as in 
producing vaccines for a pandemic, where no single company has sufficient capacity to meet 
the market demand (Price et al. 2020). 
Ad hoc exceptions to anti-trust law can be, and have been, granted in such cases. But that only 
addresses the problem in high profile cases and after the need becomes widely recognized. 
This can delay or prevent obtaining such exceptions in smaller, more specific medical (or other) 
situations where the benefit only affects a small number of people, or as soon as some 
participants become aware of the issue. Private data matching provides an alternative that could 
be allowed in advance as a matter of public policy: allowing companies to use private data 
comparison to check for potential benefits of sharing more extensive information, then limiting 
the sharing to that information alone. Or, if the actual sharing still requires a case-by-case 
evaluation, the initial private comparison could indicate to the companies whether there is 
enough benefit from sharing to make a case for an exception to the rules. 
The above scenarios envision multiple parties, each having a portion of the data and trying to 
decide whether there is a mutually beneficial opportunity to combine the data. Another scenario 
is one organization having data for sale that people usually access a few items at a time. This 
can make it prohibitively expensive to evaluate aggregate properties of the data and not just a 
few individual items. An example involves public judicial records: aggregate information is 
required to identify inconsistencies, biases, etc. in the judicial process (Pah et al. 2020). 
Interested people (e.g., academic researchers) could join together to query a data set to see if 
the aggregate information is of interest to the group, but without getting the data itself. If they 
find there's something of interest, they could then obtain funding, e.g., via social research 
grants, to pay for the data. Otherwise, they know not to bother. 
The ability to determine whether data is of interest, prior to purchase, will help more groups 
identify their interest in the data and thereby increase their willingness to purchase a large 
portion of the data.  
Due to the specialized interests of potential consumers of the data, a simple ‘one size fits all’ 
summary of the data, or a few samples will not be sufficient to determine how suitable data is 
suitable for these interests, leading potential bulk data customers to forego the opportunity or 
bid much less than the data might actually be worth to them.  
On a smaller scale, this problem arises with researchers deciding whether to purchase technical 
articles behind a paywall. If you have a specific question, viewing just an article's abstract prior 
to purchase may not be sufficient to decide whether the article answers your question. So 
instead of paying, people skip that article and look for others readily available, even if they may 
not be as relevant. 
To support more complex and specialized evaluation of the data requires a more involved 
protocol, as we describe here. The data holders could be motivated to enable this protocol by 
the possibilities of occasional much larger purchases than their normal sales of individual cases. 
To summarize, this general class of problems arises when a dataset containing private 
information consists of parts that belong to multiple parties or owners and they collectively want 
to perform analytic studies on the entire dataset while respecting the privacy and security 
concerns of each individual party. This is broadly referred to as privacy preserving data mining 
(PPDM) or secure multi-party computation (SMC) in the literature. 
 
Privacy Preserving Mechanisms 
A common approach to enable secure record linkage is to use a trusted third party (honest 
broker) (Jones, ​et al.​, 2014; Churches and Christen, 2004) or a semi-trusted third party (Schnell, 
et al.​, 2009; Lazrig, ​et al.​, 2015). However, such solutions are often not secure (Boyd, ​et al.​, 
2009; Dhir, ​et al.​, 2008) and it may be difficult for all parties to agree on a trusted intermediary, 
especially if they are constrained by legal requirements, e.g., that different parts of the data 
must remain in different jurisdictions. To address this issue, several solutions have been 
proposed in the literature. Some of these solutions are based on secure protocols such as 
garbled circuits (Yao, 1982) and oblivious transfer (​Huberman and Hogg, 2002​). Though these 
solutions provide strong security guarantees, they are inherently complex and are often 
restricted to a two party scenario. On the other hand, hash based approaches such as Bloom 
filters that have been proposed as alternative scalable solutions for privacy preserving record 
linkage (Dusserre, ​et al.​, 1995; Schnell, ​et al.​, 2009) are susceptible to different types of attacks 
such as dictionary or frequency-based ones (Agrawal, ​et al.​, 2003; Niedermeyer, ​et al.​, 2014). 
Recently there have been more direct and successful approaches. Bellala and Huberman 
(Bellala et al. 2016) proposed a secure solution for data mapping and data linkage, which arises 
as a pre-processing step in a multi-party distributed data analytics task. The goal is to identify 
the correspondence between entities in a distributed dataset and to do so while respecting the 
privacy of the data. 
For instance, in the healthcare domain, each hospital may have data belonging to a subset of 
patients with a subset of attributes. 
In any multi party distributed analytics application, one of the first steps is to ensure that the 
datasets and the corresponding data elements are aligned to facilitate subsequent analytics 
tasks such as similarity search, clustering, outlier detection, etc. 
For instance, say Party 1 may want to find patients similar to Patient ID 002 in Party 2’s 
database. Party 1 would need to compute the similarity between this patient with all patients in 
the database of Party 2. In order to compute this similarity, Party 1 would first need to identify 
the set of common attributes between the two databases, and order (or link) these common 
attributes to facilitate similarity computation. 
One approach is based on a ring protocol that works as follows. 
1. Party 1 would first mask its private list ​X​1​ composed of elements {​a​,​b​} using its secret key ​k1​, 
share it with party 2, who in turn would further encrypt the incoming data using his secret key ​k2 
and share with the next party who repeats this process. The ring protocol would terminate at 
party 1, after all the parties have masked the data using their secret key. 
2. Party 1 would publish its encrypted data to all other parties participating in the protocol. 
  
  
Each party would follow the same approach by applying the ring protocol to encrypt their private 
list using the secret keys of all parties, and then share the encrypted data with all parties. Once 
all parties complete the above two steps, they can find the intersecting set by matching the 
encrypted data, and agree on a common order. 
Note that this ring topology approach is not susceptible to collusion. For example, if parties ​i​-1 
and ​i​+1 collude, they cannot guess the secret key of party i, due to the intractability of the 
discrete logarithm problem as described above. 
An alternative approach to the second step described above would be to use an untrusted 
mediator (or a broker), where each party would send its final encrypted values to the untrusted 
mediator, who would extract the set of common entities, and order them. Note that the mediator 
only has access to encrypted data. Moreover, the mediator would not be able to guess the 
secret key of a party, even if he colluded with one or more parties, again due to the intractability 
of the discrete logarithm problem. 
Is There Room to Negotiate?  
 
Arranging to combine data while ensuring privacy requires considerable effort to set up, e.g., to 
gain regulatory approvals in multiple legal jurisdictions. Before taking on this effort, the parties 
involved would benefit from knowing whether there is room to negotiate a mutually beneficial 
agreement. This is a preliminary round of private data sharing where each party has their 
reservation price but is reluctant to reveal that price to others since that could harm their 
negotiating position. This reluctance can lead to extensive preliminary discussions, when there 
may not be an overlap of prices that could lead to a deal. Or the parties may forego attempting 
to find a deal because of this uncertainty.  
 
As an example of the kinds of negotiations that can take place while keeping most of the data 
private is the following zero-knowledge based protocol. 
A key feature of this protocol is that if the bid is not above the reservation price, no value is 
revealed to the seller. So here in pictorial fashion is how the method works. 
 
 
In order to proceed the two parties, Alice and Bob establish a secure connection using 
conventional cryptographic protocols. 
Once the secured communication is established, Alice and Bob encode their bids and 
reservation numbers respectively, in a vector such that Bob’s vector components have as 
entries increments of its reservation number and Alice’s bid vector A has one component equal 
to her bid  and the rest of the components are 0. Alice generates a secret key x, and Bob 
generates another secret key y. Both Alice and Bob agree on a common large prime number p. 
Pictorially this is shown in Fig. 3. 
 
Once these steps have been taken, the following data exchanges takes place: 
 
 
Given the above results Alice and Bob can now transact. Notice that if Alice’s bid was smaller 
than Bob’s reservation price there would have been no match and no negotiation would be 
taking place. In that case, Alice walks away without knowing Bob’s reservation price and Bob 
does not discover Alice’s bid. If the transaction is feasible, Alice still does not discover Bob’s 
reservation price and Bob knows her bid since the transaction went ahead.  
The full security of the transaction is based on methods of secure multiparty computation (O. 
Goldreich et al. 1987). 
Generalizations and Limitations 
 
Privacy preserving mechanisms can be generalized to multiple parties. For example, to compute 
the average of private data values one can start with a random number, each person in turn 
adding their value to the previous one and passing the accumulated sum ot the next; the last 
person in the group returns the accumulated sum to the first person, who subtracts the random 
number and divides by the number of participants. This is simpler than the cryptographic 
method used in the millionaires problem. 
 
These privacy-preserving protocols make various assumptions on the motivations of 
participants, with corresponding levels of complexity to prevent misuse. The simplest case is the 
‘honest but curious’ user, who follows the protocol as agreed but will collect or infer data 
revealed by that protocol. At the other extreme are malicious actors who seek to subvert the 
protocol or pretend to perform the specified operations but instead do something else. Such 
cases require additional rounds of test and verification, leading to more computationally 
expensive protocols.  
 
The level of security required depends on the scenario, including the usefulness for legal 
recourse after the fact if someone is later found to have violated their contractually agreed 
behavior. Our discussion focuses on the case where all parties have the same overall goal of 
finding out whether there is potential for a data sharing deal, and sufficiently value their 
reputation (e.g., to participate in subsequent data sharing negotiations) so that the more 
complex cryptographic protocols are not necessary. 
 
Quantum protocols 
 
The above solutions suffer in principle from a fundamental lack of security in the form of third 
parties eavesdropping on the exchanges and possibly impersonating one negotiator. While 
standard cryptographic algorithms can protect the data in transit, very recent advances in 
quantum computing threaten the security of those protocols. 
 
Thus the need of Improved security through use of quantum internet protocols which distribute 
keys though quantum channels that are provable - and not just algorithmically- secure.  In 
particular, we describe the use of entangled photons and quantum key distribution (QKD). 
 
This quantum protocol replaces the step described above where the two parties establish a 
secure internet connection. With the quantum enhancement, they create a provably secure 
internet connection over the TLS using quantum key distribution, as shown in Fig. 2. 
 Once they have this connection, the protocol proceeds as described above. 
 
This use of quantum technology illustrates how it could be applied to the infrastructure 
supporting higher-level protocols. From the user perspective, there is no change in the 
high-level protocol they use. This allows them to easily gain the improved security of quantum 
key distribution. 
 
The Promise of Quantum Technology 
We have discussed using quantum key distribution as part of the overall protocol for secure 
database evaluation. As this technology improves, there will be an opportunity for quantum 
technology to handle a larger part of the protocol. This could further enhance security by relying 
on physical rather than computationally difficult problems for security. This could be particularly 
relevant when there are concerns that the any data exchange protocol is not only secure now 
but also for many years into the future, e.g., because the data may need to remain secure for 
the lifetime of the participants in the database. Enhanced quantum technology threatens the 
security of common protocols in use today, so switching to alternatives could help alleviate 
these concerns of future compromise, thereby enabling more extensive use of protocols for 
identifying beneficial data sharing. 
 
In addition to improving security, quantum technology offers the possibility of altering the 
incentive structure of the transactions. This application of quantum technology is distinct from its 
use to improve security or speed up some computations. Specifically, quantum transactions 
provide new possibilities on how information is exchanged and deleted, and how choices are 
correlated. This leads to changes in the incentive structure of games (Meyer 1999), which can 
be applied to help enable cooperative decision-making in groups (Huberman and Hogg 2003) 
and improve bidding incentives via information hiding in auctions (Hogg et al. 2007). The 
limitations on the length of time quantum information can be stored provides alternate methods 
for private data access (Hogg and Zhang 2009). 
 
One example is enhanced incentives for cooperation in two-party negotiations and public goods 
provisioning. Another example is quantum auctions that do not reveal losing bids without need 
for a trusted escrow agent. This can improve incentives for truthful bidding, especially in multiple 
round settings, e.g, when companies expect to bid against the same competitors each year for a 
similar auction, such as frequency spectrum. 
This could apply to data sharing that the parties expect to perform on a continuing basis, e,g., to 
handle updates to the data as each party continually receives new information. 
 
Conclusion 
 
We described how privacy preserving mechanisms can aid the discovery of shared interest in 
aggregating multiple data sets owned or controlled by different organizations. One application is 
using privacy-preserving methods to test for overlap between bid and ask prices in a 
negotiation. These techniques could help unlock the synergies among large data sets held by 
different organizations in different legal jurisdictions. This could realize the potential of the 
significant value to be gained by combining the data. Moreover, these protocols could reduce 
the many concerns organizations and governments have in specifying requirements for sharing 
data, including  legal constraints and the fear of revealing cost preferences to competitors. We 
described how these protocols could be enhanced by the ongoing development of quantum 
technology that may undermine the security of conventional methods. 
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